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Abstract
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of
different options which are the matter of a preferential vote.
In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are al-
lowed to be incomplete, that is, they need not express a comparison
between every pair of options. This includes the case where each voter
gives an ordered list restricted to a subset of most preferred options.
In this connection, the proposed method (except for one of the given
variants) carefully distinguishes a lack of information about a given
pair of options from a proper tie between them. As in the special case
of complete individual votes, the proposed generalization is proved to
have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the
rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that char-
acterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet-Smith
principle, and clone consistency.
Keywords: preferential voting, quantitative rating, continuous rat-
ing, majority principles, Condorcet-Smith principle, clone consistency,
one-dimensional scaling. approval voting,
AMS subject classifications: 05C20, 91B12, 91B14, 91C15, 91C20.
In a previous article [3 ] we introduced a method for quantitatively rating
the social acceptance of different candidate options which are the matter
of a preferential vote. The quantitative character of this method lies in a
combination of two properties: First, a property of continuity that allows
to sense the closeness between two candidates, for instance the winner and
the runner-up. Second, a property of decomposition that allows to recognise
certain situations that are opposite to a tie; in particular, a candidate gets
the best possible rate if and only if it is placed first by all voters. These two
properties are combined with other ones of a qualitative nature. Especially
outstanding among the latter is the Condorcet-Smith principle: Assume that
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the set of candidates is partitioned into two classes X and Y such that for
each member of X and every member of Y there are more than half of the
individual votes where the former is preferred to the latter; in that case, the
social ranking prefers also each member of X to any member of Y . To our
knowledge, the existing literature does not offer any other rating method that
combines the three mentioned properties, namely continuity, decomposition
and the Condorcet-Smith principle.
However, in [3 ] we restricted ourselves to the complete case, that is, we
assumed that every individual expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie)
about each pair of options. Such a restriction leaves out many cases of
interest, like for instance truncated rankings. In this article we will extend
that method to the incomplete case, where the individual votes need not
express a comparison about every pair of options. This extension will be
done in such a way that a lack of information about the preference of a
voter between a given pair of options will be carefully distinguished from a
proper tie between them. In this connection, we will have to cope with the
fact that a quantitative specification of the collective opinion about a pair of
options has then two degrees of freedom; in fact, knowing how many voters
preferred x to y does not determine how many of them preferred y to x.
This introduces a special difficulty that was not present in the complete case.
An extreme case of incompleteness is that where each vote reduces to
choosing a single option. In that case our rates will be linearly related to the
vote fractions. Another important case is that of approval voting. In that
case, our rates will be essentially different from the number of received ap-
provals; however, one of the variants of our method, namely the margin-based
variant, will be shown to rank the options exactly in the same way as the
number of received approvals.
We call our quantitative method the CLC rating method, where the
capital letters stand for “Continuous Llull Condorcet”. The reader interested
to try it can use the CLC calculator which has been made available at [9 ].
Of course, any rating automatically implies a ranking. In this connection, it
should be noticed that the CLC rating method is built upon certain variants
of the qualitative ranking method that was introduced in 1997 by Markus
Schulze [13 , 14 ; 15 : p. 228–232].
This article is organized as follows: Section 1 gives a more precise state-
ment of the problem together with some general remarks. Section 2 presents
an outline of the proposed method, followed by a discussion of certain special
cases, a summary of the procedure, and a discussion of certain variants. Sec-
tion 3 gives three representative examples. Finally, sections 4–9 give detailed
mathematical proofs of the claimed properties.
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1 Statement of the problem and general remarks
1.1 Let us consider a set of N options which are the matter of a vote. Let
us assume that each voter expresses his preferences about certain pairs of
options. Our aim is to combine such individual preferences so as to rate the
social acceptance of each option on a continuous scale. More specifically, we
would like to do it in accordance with the following conditions:
A Scale invariance (homogeneity). The rates depend only on the rela-
tive frequency of each possible content of an individual vote. In other
words, if every individual vote is replaced by a fixed number of copies
of it, the rates remain exactly the same.
B Permutation equivariance (neutrality). Applying a certain permuta-
tion of the options to all of the individual votes has no other effect
than getting the same permutation in the social rating.
C Continuity. The rates depend continuously on the relative frequency
of each possible content of an individual vote.
The next two conditions consider a specific form of rating. From now on,
we will refer to it as rank-like rating.
D Rank-like form. Each rank-like rate is a number, integer or frac-
tional, between 1 and N . The best possible value is 1 and the
worst possible one is N . The average rank-like rate is larger than
or equal to (N + 1)/2, with equality in the complete case.
E Rank-like decomposition in the complete case. Assume that the in-
dividual preferences are complete, i. e. a comparison (a preference
or a tie) is expressed about every pair of options. Consider a split-
ting of the options in two classes X and Y such that each member
of X is unanimously preferred to every member of Y . Such a sit-
uation translates into the three following equivalent facts, where
|X| denotes the number of elements of X : (a) The rank-like rates
of X coincide with those that one obtains when the individual votes
are restricted to X . (b) After diminishing them by the number |X| ,
the rank-like rates of Y coincide with those that one obtains when
the individual votes are restricted to Y . (c) The average rank-like
rate of X is (|X|+ 1)/2.
In particular, in the complete case an option will get a rank-like rate exactly
equal to 1 [resp. N ] if and only if it is unanimously preferred to [resp. consid-
ered worse than] any other. As we will see later on, some of the implications
contained in the preceding condition will hold also in certain situations that
allow for incompleteness.
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The next condition considers the extreme case of incompleteness where
each vote reduces to choosing a single option.
F Rank-like rates for single-choice voting. Assume that each vote re-
duces to choosing a single option. In that case, the rank-like rate of
each option is the weighted average of the numbers 1 and N with
weights given respectively by the fraction of the vote in favour of
that option and the complementary fraction.
Finally, we require a condition that concerns only the concomitant social
ranking, that is, the ordinal information contained in the social rating:
M Condorcet-Smith principle. Consider a splitting of the options into
two classes X and Y . Assume that for each member of X and
every member of Y there are more than half of the individual votes
where the former is preferred to the latter. In that case, the social
ranking also prefers each member of X to every member of Y .
1.2 We will adopt the point of view of paired comparisons. In other words,
we will be based upon the number of voters who prefer x to y , where x
and y vary over all ordered pairs of options. These numbers will be denoted
by Vxy . Most of the time, however, we will be dealing with the fractions
vxy = Vxy/V , where V denotes the total number of votes. We will refer
to Vxy and vxy respectively as the absolute and relative scores of the pair
xy , and the whole collection of these scores will be called the (absolute or
relative) Llull matrix of the vote.
In the complete case one has vxy + vyx = 1, so vxy automatically de-
termines vyx . In contrast, in the incomplete case we are ensured only that
vxy + vyx ≤ 1, so vxy alone does not determine vyx . In particular, the con-
ditions vxy >
1
2
and vxy > vyx are not equivalent to each other, which
gives rise to two possible notions of majority. Anyway, in the incomplete
case a quantitative specification of preference between two options x and y
requires the values of both vxy and vyx , or equivalently, their sum and dif-
ference, txy = vxy + vyx and mxy = vxy − vyx , which we will call respectively
the (relative) turnout and margin associated with the pair xy .
1.3 In preferential voting the individual preferences are usually assumed to
be expressed in the form of a ranking, that is, a list of options in order of
preference. In this connection, it is quite natural to admit the possibility of
ties as well as incomplete lists. When we are dealing with incomplete lists,
their translation into paired comparisons admits of several interpretations.
In most cases, it is reasonable to use the following one:
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(a) When x and y are both in the list and x is ranked above y (without
a tie), we certainly interpret that x is preferred to y .
(b) When x and y are both in the list and x is ranked as good as y ,
we interpret it as being equivalent to half a vote preferring x to y
plus another half a vote preferring y to x.
(c) When x is in the list and y is not in it, we interpret that x is
preferred to y .
(d) When neither x nor y are in the list, we interpret nothing about
the preference of the voter between x and y .
Instead of rule (d), one can consider the possibility of using the following
alternative:
(d ′ ) When neither x nor y are in the list, we interpret that they are
considered equally good (or equally bad), so we proceed as in (b).
This amounts to complete each truncated ranking by appending to it all the
missing options tied to each other, which brings the problem to the complete
case considered in [3 ]. Generally speaking, however, this interpretation can
be criticized in that the added information might not be really meant by the
voter.
On the other hand, in the spirit of not adding any information not really
meant by the voter, in certain cases it may be appropriate to replace rule (c)
by the following one:
(c ′ ) When x is in the list and y is not in it, we interpret nothing about
the preference of the voter between x and y .
Generally speaking, the individual votes could be arbitrary binary rela-
tions, interpreted as it is mentioned in [3 : § 3.1]; even more generally, they
could be valued binary relations belonging to Ω={v ∈ [0, 1]Π | vxy+vyx ≤ 1} ,
where Π denotes the set of pairs xy ∈ A × A with x 6= y [3 : § 3.3]. Such
a possibility makes sense in that the individual opinions may already be the
result of aggregating a variety of criteria.
Anyway, the collective Llull matrix is simply the center of gravity of
a distribution of individual votes:
vxy =
∑
k
αk v
k
xy, (1)
where αk are the relative frequencies or weights of the individual votes v
k∈Ω.
1.4 In the particular case where the set X consists of a single option,
the Condorcet-Smith principle M takes the following form:
6 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
M1 Condorcet principle (majority form). If an option x has the property
that for every y 6= x there are more than half of the individual votes
where x is preferred to y , then x is the social winner.
In the complete case (where the Condorcet principle was originally proposed)
the preceding condition is equivalent to the following one:
M1 ′ Condorcet principle (margin form). If an option x has the property
that for every y 6= x there are more individual votes where x is
preferred to y than vice versa, then x is the social winner.
However, generally speaking condition M1 is weaker than M1 ′ , and the
CLC method will satisfy only the weaker version.
This lack of compliance with the stronger condition M1 ′ may be consid-
ered undesirable. However, other authors have already remarked the need
to require only M1 in order to be able to keep other properties (see for
instance [17 ]). In our case, M1 ′ seems to conflict with the continuity prop-
erty C.
1.5 Conditions E and M refer to cases where all the voters or at least half
of them proceed in a certain way. Of course, it should be clear whether
all the voters means all of the actual ones or maybe all the potential ones
(i. e. actual voters plus abstainers). We assume that one has made a choice in
that connection, thus defining the total number of voters V . Mathematically
speaking, we only need V to be larger than any absolute turnout Vxy + Vyx .
Increasing the value of V has no other effect than contracting the final rating
towards the point where all rates take the worst possible value (N for rank-
like rates).
2 Outline of the method
This section presents the proposed method at the same time that it introduces
the associated terminology. As in [3 ], the procedure involves a projection of
the Llull matrix onto a special set of such matrices. Steps 0–3, as well as
the last one, will be exactly the same as in the complete case. However,
steps 4 and 5 contain new elements. More specifically, step 4 requires a
quadratic optimization in connection with the turnouts, and step 5 takes
the union of certain intervals where the complete case takes the maximum
of certain margins. The reasons behind steps 1–3 and 6 were explained in
[3 : § 2]. Those behind steps 4 and 5 will be briefly explained in § 2.2.3, after
having looked at the particularities of the complete case as well as those of
single-choice voting.
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2.1 Step 0. To begin with, we must form the Llull matrix (vxy). Its entries
are the relative scores vxy = Vxy/V , where V is the number of voters, and
Vxy counts how many of them prefer x to y . In the case of ranking votes,
this count will usually make use of rules (a–d) of § 1.3, though in certain
cases it may be reasonable to replace rule (c) by (c ′ ), or rule (d) by (d ′ ).
Besides the scores themselves, which will be used in the next step, later on
we will also make use of the associated turnouts
txy = vxy + vyx. (2)
Step 1. Concerning the margin component, we will rely on the indirect
scores v∗xy . They derive from the original scores through an operation that
generalizes the notion of transitive closure to valued relations. More specifi-
caly, they are defined in the following way:
v∗xy = max {vα | α is a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 = x to xn = y }, (3)
where the score vα of a path α = x0x1 . . . xn is defined as
vα = min {vxixi+1 | 0 ≤ i < n }. (4)
Obviously, we have
0 ≤ v∗xy ≤ 1, (5)
v∗xy ≥ vxy. (6)
The indirect turnouts v∗xy + v
∗
yx can be larger than 1. However, the follow-
ing steps will use the indirect scores only through the associated indirect
margins
mκxy = v
∗
xy − v
∗
yx. (7)
Step 2. This step is the discrete core of the procedure. It begins by consid-
ering the indirect comparison relation
κ = { xy | mκxy > 0 }, (8)
as well as its codual
κˆ = { xy | mκxy ≥ 0 }. (9)
The relation κ has the virtue of being transitive. This crucial fact was
remarked in 1998 by Markus Schulze [13 b ]. As a consequence, κ is a partial
order, and therefore one can always extend it to a total order ξ . For instance,
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according to Proposition 5.2 of [3 ], it suffices to arrange the options by non-
decreasing values of the “tie-splitting” Copeland ranks
rx = 1 + |{ y | y 6=x, m
κ
yx>0}| +
1
2 |{ y | y 6=x, m
κ
yx=0}|. (10)
Such a total order extension ξ automatically satisfies not only κ ⊆ ξ but
also ξ ⊆ κˆ. In the following we call it an admissible order .
The following steps assume that one has fixed an admissible order ξ .
The intermediate quantities computed in these steps may depend on which
admissible order is used, but the final results will be independent of it. From
now on, the situation xy ∈ ξ will be expressed also by writing x ≻ξ y .
Furthermore, x′ will mean the immediate successor of x in ξ .
Step 3. Starting from the indirect margins mκxy , one computes the super-
diagonal intermediate projected margins
mσxx′ = min {m
κ
pq | p ≻−
ξ x, x′ ≻−
ξ q }. (11)
Step 4. Starting from the original turnouts txy , one computes the inter-
mediate projected turnouts tσxy , These numbers depend not only on the
original turnouts txy , but also on the superdiagonal intermediate projected
margins mσxx′ . More specifically, they are taken as the values of τxy that
minimize the quantity
Φ =
∑
x
∑
y 6=x
(τxy − txy)
2 (12)
under the following constraints:
τxy = τyx, (13)
mσxx′ ≤ τxx′ ≤ 1, (14)
0 ≤ τxz − τx′z ≤ m
σ
xx′, whenever z 6∈ {x, x
′}. (15)
The actual computation of the minimizer can be carried out in a finite number
of steps by means of a quadratic programming algorithm [10 : ch. 16]. For
future reference, the set of matrices (τxy) that satisfy (13–15) will be denoted
as T , and the preceding minimizing operation that defines the intermediate
projected turnouts (tσxy) as a function of the original turnouts (tpq) and the
superdiagonal intermediate projected margins (mσpp′) will be denoted as Ψ:
tσxy = Ψ[(tpq), (m
σ
pp′)]xy. (16)
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Step 5. Form the intervals
γxx′ = [ (t
σ
xx′ −m
σ
xx′)/2 , (t
σ
xx′ +m
σ
xx′)/2 ], (17)
as well as their unions
γxy =
⋃
γpp′, with p varying in the interval x ≻−
ξ p ≻ξ y , (18)
where xy is restricted to satisfy x ≻ξ y . The sets γxy are still intervals.
The projected scores are the upper and lower bounds of these intervals:
vπxy = max γxy, v
π
yx = min γxy. (19)
Equivalently to (17–19), the projected scores can be computed also in the
following way, which has a more practical character: Take
vπxx′ = (t
σ
xx′ +m
σ
xx′)/2, v
π
x′x = (t
σ
xx′ −m
σ
xx′)/2, (20)
and then, for x ≻ξ y ,
vπxy = max {v
π
pp′ | x ≻−
ξ p ≻ξ y}, vπyx = min {v
π
p′p | x ≻−
ξ p ≻ξ y} (21)
Step 6. Finally, the rank-like rates are determined by the formula
Rx = N −
∑
y 6=x
vπxy (22)
2.2 Special cases and heuristic considerations.
2.2.1 In the complete case the original turnouts txy are all of them equal
to 1. One easily sees that in these circumstances step 4 results in tσxy also
equal to 1 for all pairs xy . In fact, this choice clearly satisfies conditions (13–
15) at the same time that it certainly minimizes (12) to 0. As a consequence,
the intervals γxx′ defined by (17) are all of them centred at 1/2. Obviously,
this property will be inherited by their unions γxy . On the other hand,
one easily sees that the width of γxy , in other words the projected margin
mπxy = v
π
xy − v
π
yx , will be the following: m
π
xy = max {m
σ
pp′ | x ≻−
ξ
p ≻ξ y} .
So, in the complete case the above-described procedure reduces to the one that
was presented in [3 ].
10 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
2.2.2 Let us see what we get in the case of single-choice voting. To be-
gin with, rules (c–d) of § 1.3 result in vxy = fx for every y 6= x, where fx is the
fraction of voters who choose x. This implies that v∗xy = vxy = fx . In fact,
any path γ from x to y starts with a link of the form xp, whose associated
score is vxp = fx . So vγ ≤ fx and therefore v
∗
xy ≤ fx . But on the other hand
fx = vxy ≤ v
∗
xy . Consequently, we get m
κ
xy = v
∗
xy−v
∗
yx = vxy−vyx = fx−fy ,
and the admissible orders are those for which the fx are non-increasing.
Owing to this non-increasing character, the intermediate projected margins
are mσxx′ = mxx′ = fx − fx′ . On the other hand, the intermediate projected
turnouts are tσxy = txy = fx + fy . In fact these numbers are easily seen
to satisfy conditions (14–15) and they obviously minimize (12). As a con-
sequence, γxx′ = [fx′ , fx]. In particular, the intervals γxx′ and γx′x′′ are
adjacent to each other (the right end of the latter coincides with the left
end of the former). This fact entails that γxy = [fy, fx] whenever x ≻
ξ
y .
So, the projected scores are the end points of these intervals, namely vπxy = fx
and vπyx = fy . In particular, they coincide with the original scores. Finally,
the rank-like rates are Rx = 1 + (N − 1)fx = fx + (1 − fx)N , as stated by
condition F.
2.2.3 In § 2.2.1 we have seen that in the complete case, the projected
margins are obtained from the superdiagonal intermediate ones by means of
a maximum operation: mπxy = max {m
σ
pp′ | x ≻−
ξ p ≻ξ y} (whenever x ≻ξ y ).
In contrast, in the case of single-choice voting we have a sum: mπxy =∑
{mσpp′ | x ≻−
ξ p ≻ξ y} (whenever x ≻ξ y , since we have both mπxy = mxy =
fx − fy and m
σ
pp′ = mpp′ = fp − fp′ ); as we have just seen in § 2.2.2, it
must necessarily be so if we are to satisfy condition F. So a general method
requires an operation that reduces to maximum in one case and to addition
in the other.
This leads to the idea that this general operation should be that of tak-
ing the union of suitable “score intervals”. A score interval can be viewed
as giving a pair of scores about two options, these scores being respectively
in favour and against a specified preference about the two options. Alterna-
tively, it can be viewed as giving a certain margin together with a certain
turnout. Following on this line, one can be tempted to also replace the min-
imum operation (11) of step 3 by an intersection of the score intervals that
combine the original turnouts txy with the indirect margins m
κ
xy . Such a
procedure works as desired both in the case of complete votes and that of
single-choice voting. However, it breaks down in other cases of incomplete
votes that produce empty intersections and disjoint unions.
In order to avoid these problems, we were led to replace the original
turnouts txy by the intermediate projected ones t
σ
xy . As we will see, the
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constraints that are imposed on the latter have the virtue of ensuring a non-
empty intersection for any two consecutive intervals γxx′ and γx′x′′ . On the
other hand, they ensure also the inequality tπxx′ ≥ t
π
x′x′′ . These facts will be
crucial for achieving the following properties for the final rank-like rates Rx :
(a) being the same for any admissible order ξ ; and (b) being consistent with
any such order ξ , i. e. having Rx ≤ Ry whenever x ≻
ξ
y .
2.3 Summary
0. Form the Llull matrix (vxy). Work out the turnouts txy = vxy + vyx .
1. Compute the indirect scores v∗xy defined by (3–4). An efficient way to
do it is the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [4 : § 25.2]. For small values of N ,
one can do it by hand in successive steps that progressively increase the
length of the paths under consideration. Having computed the indirect
scores, one works out the indirect margins mκxy=v
∗
xy−v
∗
yx .
2. Consider the indirect comparison relation κ = {xy | mκxy > 0} . Fix
an admissible order ξ , i. e. a total order that extends κ. For instance,
it suffices to arrange the options by non-decreasing values of the “tie-
splitting” Copeland ranks (10).
3. Starting from the indirect margins mκxy , work out the superdiagonal
intermediate projected margins mσxx′ as defined in (11).
4. Starting from the original turnouts txy , and taking into account the su-
perdiagonal intermediate projected margins mσxx′ , determine the inter-
mediate projected turnouts tσxy by minimizing (12) under the
constraints (13–15). This can be carried out in a finite number of
steps by means of a quadratic programming algorithm [10 : ch. 16].
5. Form the intervals γxx′ defined by (17), derive their unions γxy as defi-
ned by (18), and read off the projected scores vπxy (19).
Or equivalently:
Compute the sub- and super-diagonal projected scores as defined by (20),
and then derive all the others according to (21).
6. Compute the rank-like rates Rx according to (22).
2.4 Variants. The preceding procedure admits of certain variants which
might be appropriate to some special situations. Next we will distinguish
four of them, namely
1. Main
2. Codual
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3. Balanced
4. Margin-based
The above-described procedure is included in this list as the main variant.
The four variants are exactly equivalent to each other in the complete case,
but in the incomplete case they can produce different results. In spite of this,
they all share the main properties. Having said that, the proofs given in this
paper assume either the main variant or the margin-based one.
The codual variant is analogous to the main one except that the max-min
indirect scores v∗xy are replaced by the following min-max ones:
∗vxy = min
x0 = x
xn = y
max
i ≥ 0
i < n
vxixi+1 . (23)
Equivalently, ∗vxy = 1 − vˆ
∗
yx where vˆxy = 1 − vyx . In the complete case one
has ∗vxy = 1 − v
∗
yx , so that
∗vxy −
∗vyx = v
∗
xy − v
∗
yx ; as a consequence, the
codual variant is then equivalent to the main one.
The balanced variant takes κ = {xy | v∗xy>v
∗
yx,
∗vxy>
∗vyx} together with
mκxy =


min (v∗xy − v
∗
yx,
∗vxy −
∗vyx), if xy ∈ κ,
−mκyx, if yx ∈ κ,
0, otherwise.
(24)
The remarks made in connection with the codual variant show that in the
complete case the balanced variant is also equivalent to the preceding ones.
The margin-based variant follows the procedure of [3 ] even if one is not
originally in the complete case. Equivalently, it corresponds to replacing
the original scores vxy by the following ones: v
′
xy = (1 + mxy)/2, where
mxy = vxy − vyx . This amounts to replacing any lack of information about a
pair of options by a proper tie between them, which brings the problem into
the complete case. In the case of ranking votes, it corresponds to interpreting
the votes using rule (d ′ ) instead of rule (d) as mentioned in § 1.3. So, the
specific character of this variant lies only in its interpretation of incomplete
votes.
Remark. Other variants —in the incomplete case— arise when equation (22)
is replaced by the following one:
Rx = 1 +
∑
y 6=x
vπyx. (25)
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2.5 The main ideas that underlie the indirect scores of step 1 and the
associated indirect comparison relation κ are the same as in the ranking
method of Markus Schulze [14 ]. Like us, he allows for the Llull matrix to
be incomplete, and he distinguishes several variant methods. One of them is
a margin variant that coincides essentially with ours; more specifically, both
of them give exactly the same indirect comparison relation κ —Schulze’s O—
although they may differ in the subsequent treatment of ties.
However, aside from the margin approach, which does not properly face
incompleteness, none of our other variants coincides with any of Schulze’s
ones. As a matter of fact, they can result in different indirect comparison
relations κ and therefore, by Theorem 5.2 below, in different final rankings.
In this connection, we may add that none of Schulze’s variants except the
margin one is appropriate for being extended to a continuous rating method.
In fact, to this effect, the strength comparison relation ≻D that Schulze uses
to compare the pairs (vxy, vyx) with each other should remain unchanged
under small perturbations of the scores. However, this is not the case for
any of those variants, namely D = ratio , D = win , and D = los . More
specifically, by looking at the corresponding definitions of ≻D , one easily
checks that one can have, for instance, (v, v′) ≻D (w,w) but, in contrast,
(w + ǫ, w) ≻D (v, v
′) for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0; to this effect it suffices to
assume 1 > v > v′ > 0 and to choose w as follows depending on D : w > v
for D = win ; w < v′ for D = los ; w = 0 for D = ratio .
3 Examples
3.1 As an example of a vote which involved truncated rankings, we look
at an election which took place the 16th of February of 1652 in the Span-
ish royal household. This election is quoted in [12 ], but we use the more
reliable and slightly different data which are given in [11 : vol. 2, p. 263–264].
The office under election was that of “aposentador mayor de palacio”, and
the king was assessed by six noblemen, who expressed respectively the fol-
lowing preferences about six candidates a – f : b ≻ e ≻ d ≻ a ; b ≻ a ≻ f ;
a ≻ f ≻ b ≻ d ; e ≻ b ≻ f ≻ c ; e ≻ a ≻ b ≻ f ; b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ f .
The CLC computations are shown below. Instead of relative scores, mar-
gins and turnouts, we will show their absolute counterparts, i. e. without
dividing them by the total number of votes. This has the virtue of staying
with small integer numbers. Pairwise information will be given by means of
square matrices; as usual, the cell in row x and column y corresponds to the
pair xy . Since we consider only pairs xy with x 6= y , we use the diagonal
cells for specifying the simultaneous labelling of rows and columns by the
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members of A. We must specify the labelling since at a certain stage we will
rearrange the options in accordance with an admissible order.
We begin by forming the Llull matrix (Vxy) (step 0) and deriving the
corresponding indirect scores (V ∗xy) (step 1):
(Vxy) =
a 2 5 3 3 5
4 b 6 6 4 5
1 0 c 1 0 0
2 0 3 d 2 2
3 2 3 3 e 3
1 1 5 4 3 f
; (V ∗xy) =
a 2 5 4 3 5
4 b 6 6 4 5
1 1 c 1 1 1
2 2 3 d 2 2
3 2 3 3 e 3
3 2 5 4 3 f
. (26)
In the matrix of the indirect scores we have visualized the indirect comparison
relation κ by marking in black bold face those pairs xy that belong to it,
i. e. that satisfy V ∗xy > V
∗
yx . Those that satisfy V
∗
xy = V
∗
yx are shown in grey
bold face. In accordance with (10), the Copeland rank of each option is then
easily worked out as the number of black bold faces in the corresponding
column plus half the number of grey bold faces in it plus one. The resulting
values are shown next:
(rx) =
a b c d e f
212 1 6 5 3 3
1
2
. (27)
Arranging the options by non-decreasing values of rx gives an admissible
order. In this case there is only one possibility, namely b ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f ≻ d ≻ c .
This completes step 2. From now on, the options will be arranged in this
order. We now take the indirect margins Mκxy = V
∗
xy − V
∗
yx to work out
the superdiagonal intermediate projected margins Mσxx′ (step 3). Having
arranged the options in the adopted admissible order, Mσxx′ is simply the
minimum Mκ value in the rectangle that lies to the right of x and above x′ :
(Mκxy) =
b 2 2 3 4 5
∗ a 0 2 2 4
∗ ∗ e 0 1 2
∗ ∗ ∗ f 2 4
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ d 2
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ c
; (Mσxx′) =
b 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ a 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ e 0 ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ f 1 ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ d 2
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ c
. (28)
We now take the original turnouts Txy to determine the intermediate pro-
jected ones T σxy (step 4). This involves also the superdiagonal intermediate
projected margins Mσxx′ and requires solving (the absolute counterpart of)
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the problem of minimizing (12) under the constraints (13–15). The results
are shown below:
(Txy) =
b 6 6 6 6 6
∗ a 6 6 5 6
∗ ∗ e 6 5 3
∗ ∗ ∗ f 6 5
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ d 4
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ c
; (T σxy) =
b 6 6 6 6 6
∗ a 6 6 513 4
2
3
∗ ∗ e 6 513 4
2
3
∗ ∗ ∗ f 513 4
2
3
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ d 4
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ c
. (29)
Although the last step involved all of the intermediate projected turnouts,
the next one uses only the superdiagonal ones T σxx′ . These numbers together
with the superdiagonal intermediate margins Mσxx′ determine the intervals
Γxx′ = ((T
σ
x′x − M
σ
xx′)/2, (T
σ
x′x + M
σ
xx′)/2) = (V
π
x′x, V
π
xx′), whose unions as
in (18) give all the other intervals Γxy = (V
π
yx, V
π
xy) (step 5):
(V πxy) =
b 4 4 4 4 4
2 a 3 3 316 3
1
6
2 3 e 3 316 3
1
6
2 3 3 f 316 3
1
6
2 216 2
1
6 2
1
6 d 3
1 1 1 1 1 c
. (30)
Finally, the rank-like rates are obtained from the projected scores by means
of formula (22) with vπxy = V
π
xy/V (step 6):
(Rx) =
b a e f d c
2.6667 3.6111 3.6111 3.6111 4.0833 5.1667
. (31)
According to these results, the office should have been given to candi-
date b , who is also the winner by most other methods. In the CLC method,
this candidate is followed by three runners-up tied to each other, namely can-
didates a , e and f . In spite of the clear advantage of candidate b , the king
appointed candidate f , which was the celebrated painter Diego Vela´zquez.
3.2 As a second example of an election involving truncated rankings we take
the Debian Project leader election, which is using the qualitative method of
Markus Schulze since 2003. So far, the winners of these elections have been
clear enough. However, a quantitative measure of this clearness was lacking.
In the following we consider the 2006 election, which had a participation of
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V = 421 actual voters out of a total population of 972 members. The indi-
vidual votes were taken from http://www.debian.org/vote/2006/vote-002.
The next tables show the Llull matrix of that election and the resulting
rank-like rates:
(Vxy) =
1 321 144 15912 193
1
2 347
1
2 246 320
51 2 42 53 50 262 65 163
251 340 3 19812 253 362 300 345
245
1
2 341 204
1
2 4 256 371
1
2 291
1
2 339
1
2
193
1
2 325 144 149 5 357 254 321
1
2
2612 77 24 22
1
2 21 6 30 74
1
2
137 292 90 10912 131 330 7 296
76 207 54 7112 75
1
2 302
1
2 89 8
, (32)
(Rx) =
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4.1105 5.9145 3.6926 3.6784 4.1105 6.7197 4.5720 5.8100
. (33)
In this case, the CLC results are in full agreement with the Copeland ranks
of the original Llull matrix. In particular, both of them give an exact tie
between candidates 1 and 5 . Even so, the CLC rates yield a quantitative
information which is not present in the Copeland ranks.
For the computation of the rates we have taken V = 421 (the actual
number of votes) instead of V = 972 (the number of people with the right to
vote). This is especially justified in Debian elections since they systematically
include “none of the above” as one of the alternatives, so it is reasonable
to interpret that abstention does not have a critical character. In this case,
“none of the above” was alternative 8 , which obtained a better result than
two of the real candidates.
3.3 Finally, we look at an example of approval voting. Specifically, we
consider the 2006 Public Choice Society election [1 ]. Besides an approval
vote, here the voters were also asked for a preferential vote “in the spirit
of research on public choice”. However, here we will limit ourselves to the
approval vote, which was the official one. The vote had a participation of
V = 37 voters, most of which approved more than one candidate.
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The actual ballots are listed in the following table,1 where we give not
only the approval voting data but also the the expressed preferences. The
approved candidates are the ones which lie at the left of the slash.
A ≻ B /
A ≻ C ≻ B /
D / A ≻ B ≻ E ≻ C
B ≻ A / D ≻ C ≻ E
D ≻ A ≻ B ≻ C / E
C ≻ B ≻ A /
E / D
C ≻ A ≻ B ≻ E /
D ≻ E / C ≻ A ≻ B
E /
B ≻ C /
D ≻ C / B ≻ E ≻ A
B /
A /
A /
D / A ∼ B ∼ C ∼ E
A ∼ C /
/ B ≻ E ≻ A ≻ D ≻ C
A ∼ B ∼ E /
A ∼ B ∼ C ∼ D ∼ E /
D ≻ A ≻ B /
B ≻ D ≻ A / C ≻ E
A / B ≻ E ≻ C ≻ D
D /
A ∼ C ≻ B / D ≻ E
A / D ≻ B ≻ C ≻ E
C / B ≻ D ≻ A ≻ E
C /
D ∼ E / A ≻ B ∼ C
B / C ≻ A ≻ D ≻ E
D ≻ C ≻ E /
C / A ≻ B ∼ D ∼ E
C /
B ≻ D / E ≻ C ≻ A
B ≻ C / A ≻ E ≻ D
D ≻ A ≻ C ≻ B /
D ≻ E / A ≻ B
The next table gives the number of received approvals Ax together with
the rank-like rates resulting from the four variants of the CLC method (the
superindices 1, 2, 3, 4 indicate respectively the main, codual, balanced and
margin-based variants).
x A B C D E
Ax 17 16 17 14 9
R1x 3.6014 3.6486 3.6149 3.7720 4.1689
R2x 3.6081 3.6486 3.6081 3.7568 4.2162
R3x 3.6081 3.6486 3.6081 3.7703 4.1622
R4x 2.8919 2.9324 2.8919 3.0135 3.2703
As one can see, the approval scores result in a tie for the first place between
candidates A and C , which are followed at a minimum distance by can-
didate B and then by candidates D and E . Exactly the same ranking is
found in the results of the codual, balanced and margin-based variants of the
CLC method, but not in those of the main variant, which discriminates be-
tween candidates A and C , giving the victory to A . In § 9 we will see that
the ranking given by the margin-based variant is always in full agreement
with that given by the approval score.
1We are grateful to Prof. Steven J. Brams, who was the president of the Public Choice
Society when that election took place, for his kind permission to reproduce these data.
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4 The projection. Well-definedness and structural properties
As it was seen in § 2, the CLC method involves in a crucial way a projection
(vxy) 7→ (v
π
xy) of the original Llull matrix onto a special set of such matrices.
In this section we will see that this projection is well defined and we will look
at certain structural properties of the resulting matrix.
The projection comprises steps 1–5 of the CLC procedure. In order to en-
sure that it is well defined, one must check the following points:
(a) The existence (and effective production) of an admissible order ξ . Since it
involves only steps 1–2, before any divergence of the procedure from the com-
plete case, this point requires no other considerations than those made in [3 ].
(b) The existence and uniqueness of a minimizer of (12) under the condi-
tions (13–15). This is a consequence of the fact that the set T defined by
these conditions is a closed convex set [7 : ch. I, § 2]. In this connection, one
can say that (tσxy) is the orthogonal projection of (txy) onto the convex set T .
And (c) that the final results are independent of the admissible order ξ when
there are several possibilities for it. This will be dealt with by Theorem 4.2
below, whose proof is rather long, but not difficult.
Before embarking on that theorem, however, we will look at certain prop-
erties of the intervals γxy . Besides being used in that theorem, these prop-
erties will be seen later on to be at the core of the structure of the projected
Llull matrix. We will use the following notation: |γ| means the length of an
interval, and
•
γ means its barycentre, or centroid, i. e. the number (a+ b)/2
if γ = [a, b].
Lemma 4.1. The sets γxy have the following properties for x ≻
ξ
y ≻ξ z :
(a) γxy is a closed interval.
(b) γxy ⊆ [0, 1].
(c) γxz = γxy ∪ γyz .
(d) γxy ∩ γyz 6= ∅.
(e) |γxz| ≥ max ( |γxy| , |γyz| ).
(f)
•
γxy ≥
•
γxz ≥
•
γyz .
(g)
•
γxy − |γyz|/2 ≤
•
γxz ≤
•
γyz + |γxy|/2.
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that the superdiagonal intermediate turnouts
and margins are ensured to satisfy the following inequalities:
0 ≤ mσxx′ ≤ t
σ
xx′ ≤ 1 (34)
0 ≤ tσxx′ − t
σ
x′x′′ ≤ m
σ
xx′ +m
σ
x′x′′ . (35)
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The inequalities of (34) are those of (14), with tσxx′ substituted for τxx′ , plus
the fact that mσxx′ ≥ 0. Those of (35) are the result of adding up (15) with
x and z replaced respectively by x′ and x plus the same inequality with z
replaced by x′′ , and using the symmetric character of the turnouts.
From (34) it follows that 0 ≤ (tσxx′ −m
σ
xx′)/2 ≤ (t
σ
xx′ +m
σ
xx′)/2 ≤ 1. So,
every γxx′ is an interval (possibly reduced to one point) and this interval
is contained in [0, 1]. Also, the inequalities of (35) ensure on the one hand
that
•
γxx′ ≥
•
γx′x′′ , and on the other hand that the intervals γxx′ and γx′x′′
overlap each other. In the following we will see that these facts about the
elementary intervals γxx′ entail the stated properties of the sets γxy defined
by (18).
Part (a). This is an obvious consequence of the fact that γpp′ and γp′p′′
overlap each other.
Part (b). This follows from the fact that γpp′ ⊆ [0, 1].
Part (c). This is a consequence of the associative property enjoyed by the
set-union operation.
Part (d). This is again an obvious consequence of the fact that γpp′ and
γp′p′′ overlap each other (take p
′ = y ).
Part (e). This follows from (c) because γ ⊆ η implies |γ| ≤ |η| .
Part (f). This follows from the inequality
•
γpp′ ≥
•
γp′p′′ because of the
following general fact: If γ and η are two overlapping intervals with
•
γ ≥
•
η
then
•
γ ≥ (γ ∪ η)
•
≥
•
η . This follows immediately from the definition of the
barycentre.
Part (g). This follows from (c) and (d) because of the following general
fact: If γ and η are two overlapping intervals, then
•
γ − |η|/2 ≤ (γ ∪ η)
•
≤
•
γ + |η|/2. Again, this follows easily from the definitions.
Theorem 4.2. The projected scores do not depend on the admissible order ξ
used for their calculation, i. e. the value of vπxy is independent of ξ for
every xy ∈ Π. On the other hand, the matrix of the projected scores in an
admissible order ξ is also independent of ξ ; i. e. if xi denotes the element
of rank i in ξ , the value of vπxixj is independent of ξ for every pair of
indices i, j .
Remark. The two statements say different things since the identity of xi and
xj may depend on the admissible order ξ .
Proof. For the purposes of this proof it becomes necessary to change our
set-up in a certain way. In fact, until now the intermediate objects mσxy , t
σ
xy
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and γxy were considered only for x ≻
ξ
y , i. e. xy ∈ ξ . However, since we
have to deal with changing the admissible order ξ , here we will allow their
argument xy to be any pair (of different elements), no matter whether it
belongs to ξ or not. In this connection, we will certainly put mσyx = −m
σ
xy
and tσyx = t
σ
xy . On the other hand, concerning γxy and γyx , we will proceed in
the following way: if γxy = [a, b] then γyx = [b, a]. So, generally speaking the
γxy are here “oriented intervals”, i. e. ordered pairs of real numbers. However,
γxy will always be “positively oriented” when xy belongs to an admissible
order (but it will be reduced to a point whenever there is another admissible
order which includes yx). In particular, the γpp′ which are combined in (18)
are always positively oriented intervals; so, the union operation performed in
that equation can always be understood in the usual sense. In the following,
γ’ denotes the oriented interval “reverse” to γ , i. e. γ’ = [b, a] if γ = [a, b].
So, let us consider the effect of replacing ξ by another admissible order ξ˜ .
In the following, the tilde is systematically used to distinguish between hom-
ologous objects which are associated respectively with ξ and ξ˜ ; in particular,
such a notation will be used in connection with the labels of the equations
which are formulated in terms of the assumed admissible order.
With this terminology, we will prove the two following equalities. First,
γxy = γ˜xy, for any pair xy (x 6= y), (36)
where γxy are the intervals produced by (16–18) together with the operation
γyx = γ’xy , and γ˜xy are those produced by (1˜6–1˜8) together with the operation
γ˜yx = γ˜’xy . Secondly, we will see also that
γxixj = γ˜x˜ix˜j , for any pair of indices ij (i 6= j), (37)
where xi denotes the element of rank i in ξ , and analogously for x˜i in ξ˜ .
These equalities contain the statements of the theorem since the projected
scores are nothing else than the end points of the intervals γxy .
Now, by a well-known result, proved for instance in [6 ], it suffices to deal
with the case of two admissible orders ξ and ξ˜ which differ from each other
by one inversion only. So, we will assume that there are two elements a
and b such that the only difference between ξ and ξ˜ is that ξ contains ab
whereas ξ˜ contains ba. According to the definition of an admissible order,
this implies that mκab = m
κ
ba = 0.
In order to control the effect of the differences between ξ and ξ˜ , we will
make use of the following notation: p will denote the immediate predecessor
of a in ξ ; in this connection, any statement about p will be understood to
imply the assumption that the set of predecessors of a in ξ is not empty.
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Similarly, q will denote the immediate successor of b in ξ ; here too, any
statement about q will be understood to imply the assumption that the set
of successors of b in ξ is not empty. So, ξ and ξ˜ contain respectively the
paths pabq and pbaq .
Let us look first at the superdiagonal intermediate projected margins mσhh′ .
Since their definition is the same as in the complete case, one can invoke the
same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6.2 of [3 ] to obtain the equality
mσxixi+1 = m˜
σ
x˜ix˜i+1
, for any i = 1, 2, . . .N−1. (38)
In more specific terms,
mσxx′ = m˜
σ
xx′, whenever x 6= p, a, b, (39)
mσpa = m˜
σ
pb, (40)
mσab = m˜
σ
ba = 0, (41)
mσbq = m˜
σ
aq. (42)
In connection with equation (39) it should be clear that for x 6= p, a, b the
immediate successor x′ is the same in both orders ξ and ξ˜ .
Next we will see that the intermediate projected turnouts tσxy are invariant
with respect to ξ :
tσxy = t˜
σ
xy, for any pair xy (x 6= y), (43)
where tσxy are the numbers produced by (16) together with the symmetry
tσyx = t
σ
xy , and t˜
σ
xy are those produced by (1˜6) together with the symmetry
t˜σyx = t˜
σ
xy .
We will prove (43) by seeing that the set T determined by conditions
(13,14,15) coincides exactly with the set T˜ determined by (13,1˜4,1˜5). In other
words, conditions (14–15) are exactly equivalent to (1˜4–1˜5) under condition
(13), which does not depend on ξ .
In order to prove this equivalence we begin by noticing that condition (14)
coincides exactly with (1˜4) when x 6= p, a, b. This is true because, on the one
hand, x′ is then the same in both orders ξ and ξ˜ , and, on the other hand,
(39) ensures that the right-hand sides have the same value. Similarly happens
with conditions (15) and (1˜5) when z 6= p, a, b. So, it remains to deal with
conditions (14) and (1˜4) for x = p, a, b, and with conditions (15) and (1˜5)
for z = p, a, b. Now, on account of the symmetry (13), one easily sees that
condition (14) with x = a is equivalent to (1˜4) with x = b. In fact, both
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of them reduce to 0 ≤ τab ≤ 1 since m
σ
ab = m˜
σ
ba = 0, as it was obtained in
(41). This last equality ensures also the equivalence between condition (15)
with z = a and condition (1˜5) with z = b. In this case both of them reduce
to
τxa = τxb. (44)
This common equality plays a central role in the equivalence between the re-
maining conditions. Thus, its combination with (42) ensures the equivalence
between (14) with x = b and (1˜4) with x = a, as well as the equivalence
between (15) with z = b and (1˜5) with z = a when x 6= a, b. On the
other hand, its combination with (40) ensures the equivalence between (14)
and (1˜4) when x = p, as well as the equivalence between (15) and (1˜5)
when z = p and x 6= a, b. Finally, we have the two following equivalences:
(15) with z = p and x = b is equivalent to (1˜5) with z = p and x = a
because of the same equality (44) together with (40) and the symmetry (13);
and similarly, (15) with z = b and x = a is equivalent to (1˜5) with z = a
and x = b because of (44) together with (42) and (13). This completes the
proof of (43).
Having seen that condition (44) is included in both (15) and (1˜5), it
follows that the intermediate projected turnouts satisfy
tσxa = t
σ
xb, t˜
σ
xa = t˜
σ
xb. (45)
By taking x = p, q and using also (43), it follows that
tσxx′ = t˜
σ
xx′, whenever x 6= p, a, b, (46)
tσpa = t˜
σ
pb, (47)
tσab = t˜
σ
ba, (48)
tσbq = t˜
σ
aq. (49)
In other words, the superdiagonal intermediate turnouts satisfy
tσxixi+1 = t˜
σ
x˜ix˜i+1
, for any i = 1, 2, . . .N−1. (50)
On account of the definition of γxixi+1 and γ˜x˜ix˜i+1 , the combination of (38)
and (50) results in
γxixi+1 = γ˜x˜ix˜i+1 , for any i = 1, 2, . . .N−1, (51)
from which the union operation (18) produces (37).
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Finally, let us see that (36) holds too. To this effect, we begin by noticing
that (41) together with (48) are saying not only that γab = γ˜ba but also that
this interval reduces to a point. As a consequence, we have
γba = γab = γ˜ba = γ˜ab. (52)
Let us consider now the equation γpa = γ˜pb , which is contained in (51). Since
γab reduces to a point, parts (c) and (d) of Lemma 4.1 give γpb = γpa∪ γab =
γpa . Analogously, γ˜pa = γ˜pb ∪ γ˜ba = γ˜pb . Altogether, this gives
γpb = γpa = γ˜pb = γ˜pa. (53)
By means of an analogous argument, one obtains also that
γaq = γbq = γ˜aq = γ˜bq. (54)
On the other hand, (51) ensures that
γxx′ = γ˜xx′, whenever x 6= p, a, b. (55)
Finally, part (c) of Lemma 4.1 allows to go from (52–55) to the desired general
equality (36).
Theorem 4.3. The projected scores and their asssociated margins and turn-
outs satisfy the following properties with respect to any admissible order ξ :
(a) The following inequalities hold for x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z :
vπxy ≥ v
π
yx, i. e. m
π
xy ≥ 0, (56)
vπxz = max (v
π
xy, v
π
yz), (57)
vπzx = min (v
π
zy, v
π
yx), (58)
mπxz ≤ m
π
xy + m
π
yz, (59)
tπxz − t
π
yz ≤ m
π
xy, t
π
xy − t
π
xz ≤ m
π
yz. (60)
(b) The following inequalities hold for x ≻ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}:
vπxz ≥ v
π
yz, v
π
zx ≤ v
π
zy, (61)
mπxz ≥ m
π
yz, m
π
zx ≤ m
π
zy, (62)
tπxz ≥ t
π
yz, t
π
zx ≥ t
π
zy, (63)
(c) If vπxy = v
π
yx , or equivalently m
π
xy = 0, then (61–63) are satisfied all of
them with an equality sign.
(d) The absolute projected margins dπxy = |m
π
xy| satisfy the triangular inequal-
ity dπxz ≤ d
π
xy + d
π
yz for any x, y, z .
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Proof. We will see that these properties derive from those satisfied by the
intervals γ , which are collected in Lemma 4.1. For the derivation one has to
bear in mind that vπxy and v
π
yx are respectively the right and left end points
of the interval γxy , and that m
π
xy = −m
π
yx and t
π
xy = t
π
yx are respectively the
width and twice the barycentre of γxy .
Part (a). First of all, (56) holds as soon as γxy is an interval, as it is
ensured by part (a) of Lemma 4.1. On the other hand, (57–58) are nothing
else than a paraphrase of Lemma 4.1.(c), in the same way as (57–59) is a
paraphrase of Lemma 4.1.(e). Finally, the inequalities of (60) are those of
Lemma 4.1.(g).
Part (b). Let us begin by noticing that (62) will be an immediate conse-
quence of (61), since mπxz = v
π
xz−v
π
zx and m
π
yz = v
π
yz−v
π
zy . On the other hand,
(63.2) is equivalent to (63.1). This equivalence holds because the turnouts
are symmetric. So, it remains to prove the inequalities (61) and either (63.1)
or (63.2). In order to prove them we will distinguish three cases, namely:
(i) x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z ; (ii) z ≻ξ x ≻ξ y ; (iii) x ≻ξ z ≻ξ y .
Case (i) : By part (c) of Lemma 4.1, in this case we have γxz ⊇ γyz . This
immediately implies (61) because [a, b] ⊇ [c, d ] is equivalent to saying that
b ≥ d and a ≤ c. On the other hand, the inequality (63.1) is contained in
part (f) of Lemma 4.1. Case (ii) is analogous to case (i).
Case (iii) : In this case, (61) follows from part (d) of Lemma 4.1 since
[a, b] ∩ [c, d ] 6= ∅ is equivalent to saying that b ≥ c and a ≤ d . On the
other hand, (63.1) is still contained in part (f) of Lemma 4.1 (because of the
symmetric character of the turnouts).
Part (c). The hypothesis that vπxy = v
π
yx is equivalent to saying that γxy
reduces to a point, i. e. γxy = [v, v] for some v . We will distinguish the same
three cases as in part (a).
Case (i) : On account of the overlapping property γxy ∩ γyz 6= ∅ (part (d)
of Lemma 4.1), the one-point interval γxy = [v, v] must be contained in γyz .
So, γxz = γxy ∪ γyz = γyz (where we used part (c) of Lemma 4.1). Case (ii)
is again analogous to case (i).
Case (iii) : By part (c) of Lemma 4.1 (with y and z interchanged with
each other), the fact that γxy reduces to the one-point interval [v, v] implies
that both γxz and γzy reduce also to this one-point interval.
Part (d). It suffices to consider the particular ordering x ≻ξ y ≻ξ z and
check that each of the three numbers dπxy = d
π
yx = m
π
xy , d
π
yz = d
π
zy = m
π
yz ,
dπxz = d
π
zx = m
π
xz is less than the sum of the other two. This is so since
we know that mπxz ≤ m
π
xy + m
π
yz , by (59), and also that m
π
yz ≤ m
π
xz and
mπxy ≤ m
π
xz , by (62), or more directly, by Lemma 4.1.(e).
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In § 2.2.2 we have seen that in the case of single-choice voting the pro-
jected scores coincide with the original ones. In that connection, one has the
following general result:
Proposition 4.4. Assume that there exists a total order ξ such that the
original scores and their associated margins and turnouts satisfy the following
conditions:
vxy ≥ vyx, i.e. mxy ≥ 0, whenever x ≻
ξ y, (64)
vxz = max (vxy, vyz), whenever x ≻
ξ y ≻ξ z, (65)
vzx = min (vzy, vyx), whenever x ≻
ξ y ≻ξ z, (66)
0 ≤ txz − tx′z ≤ mxx′, whenever z 6∈ {x, x
′}. (67)
In that case, the projected scores coincide with the original ones.
Proof. Let us begin by noticing that condition (67) implies, as in the proof of
Lemma 4.1, that the intervals [vx′x, vxx′] and [vx′′x′, vx′x′′] overlap each other.
In other words, one has the following inequalities “accross the diagonal”:
vx′x ≤ vx′x′′ and vx′′x′ ≤ vxx′ . Now, (65–66) together with the preceding
inequalities imply that
vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ≻
ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y} . (68)
From these facts, one can derive that
vxz ≥ min (vxy, vyz), for any x, y, z . (69)
In fact, for z ≻ξ y ≻ξ x this inequality is guaranteed by (66) (with x and z
interchanged with each other), whereas for any other ordering of x, y, z one
easily arrives at (69) as a consequence of (68).
Now, according to Lemma 4.2 of [3 ], (69) implies that the indirect scores
coincide with the original ones: v∗xy = vxy , which entails that m
κ
xy = mxy .
In particular, ξ is ensured to be an admissible order.
Proceeding with the CLC algorithm, one easily checks that mσxy = mxy
(because the pattern of growth (68) gets transmitted from the scores to the
margins) and tσxy = txy (since the turnouts are assumed to satisfy (67) and
one certainly has mxy ≤ txy ≤ 1). As a consequence of these facts, (20)
results in vπxx′ = vxx′ and v
π
x′x = vx′x , from which (21) and (65–66) lead to
conclude that vπxy = vxy for any pair xy .
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Since conditions (64–67) of Proposition 4.4 are included among the prop-
erties of the projected Llull matrix according to Theorem 4.3, one can con-
clude that they fully characterize the projected Llull matrices, and that the
operator (vxy) 7→ (v
π
xy) really deserves being called a projection:
Theorem 4.5. The operator P : Ω ∋ (vxy) 7→ (v
π
xy) ∈ Ω is idempotent,
i. e. P 2 = P . Its image PΩ consists exactly of the Llull matrices (vxy) that
satisfy (64–67) for some total order ξ .
5 The rank-like rates
Let us recall that the rank-like rates Rx are determined from the projected
scores by formula (22). The properties of the projected scores obtained in
Theorem 4.3 imply the following facts, which admit the same proof as in [3 ]
(the only change is that Theorem 4.3 of the present article must be invoked
instead of [3 :Thm. 6.3]):
Lemma 5.1 (Same proof as in [3 :Lem. 7.1]).
(a) If x ≻ξ y in an admissible order ξ , then Rx ≤ Ry .
(b) Rx = Ry if and only if v
π
xy = v
π
yx .
(c) Rx ≤ Ry implies the inequalities (56) and (61).
(d) Rx < Ry if and only if v
π
xy > v
π
yx .
(e) vπxy > v
π
yx implies x ≻
ξ y in any admissible order ξ .
Theorem 5.2 (Same proof as in [3 :Thm. 7.2]). The rank-like rating given
by (22) is related to the indirect comparison relation κ in the following way:
Rx < Ry ⇐⇒ yx 6∈ (κˆ)
∗, (70)
Rx ≤ Ry ⇐⇒ xy ∈ (κˆ)
∗, (71)
where κˆ is the codual of κ, namely κˆ = {xy | v∗xy ≥ v
∗
yx}.
Corollary 5.3 (Same proof as in [3 :Cor. 7.3]).
(a) Rx < Ry ⇒ xy ∈ κ.
(b) If κˆ is transitive (in particular, if κ is total), then Rx<Ry ⇔ xy∈κ.
(c) If κ contains a set of the form X × Y with X ∪ Y = A, then
Rx < Ry for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
In the complete case, the fact that tπxy = v
π
xy + v
π
yx = 1 implies that∑
x∈ARx = N(N + 1)/2. Related to it, one has the following general fact:
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Lemma 5.4. For any X ⊆ A one has∑
x∈X
Rx ≥ |X| (|X|+1)/2. (72)
This inequality becomes an equality when and only when the two following
conditions are satisfied:
tπxx¯ = 1, for all x, x¯ ∈ X (73)
vπxy = 1, for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X. (74)
Proof. Starting from formula (22), we obtain∑
x∈X
Rx = N |X| −
∑
x,x¯∈X
x¯6=x
vπxx¯ −
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
vπxy
≥ N |X| − |X| (|X|−1)/2 − |X| (N−|X|)
= |X| (|X|+1)/2,
where the inequality derives from the following ones: tπxx¯ = v
π
xx¯ + v
π
x¯x ≤ 1
for x, x¯ ∈ X , and vπxy ≤ 1 for x ∈ X and y 6∈ X .
6 Continuity
We claim that the rank-like rates Rx are continuous functions of the binary
scores vxy . The main difficulty in proving this statement lies in the admissible
order ξ , which plays a central role in the computations. Since ξ varies in a
discrete set, its dependence on the data cannot be continuous at all. Even
so, we claim that the final result is still a continuous function of the data.
In this connection, one can consider as data the normalized Llull ma-
trix (vxy), its domain of variation being the set Ω introduced in § 1.3. Al-
ternatively, one can consider as data the relative frequencies of the possible
votes, i. e. the coefficients αk mentioned also in § 1.3.
Theorem 6.1. The projected scores vπxy and the rank-like rates Rx depend
continuously on the Llull matrix (vxy).
Proof. Let us begin by considering the dependence of the rank-like rates on
the projected scores. This dependence is given by formula (22), which is not
only continuous but even linear (non-homogeneous).
So we are left with the problem of showing that the projection P : (vxy) 7→
(vπxy) is continuous. By arguing as in [3 :Theorem 8.1], the problem reduces
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to showing the continuity of Pξ : Ωξ → Ω for an arbitrary total order ξ ,
where Ωξ means the subset of Ω which consists of the Llull matrices for
which ξ is an admissible order, and Pξ means the restriction of P to Ωξ .
In order to check that Pξ is continuous for every total order ξ , one has
to go over the different mappings whose composition defines Pξ (see § 2.1),
namely: (vxy) 7→ (v
∗
xy) 7→ (m
κ
xy), (vxy) 7→ (txy), (m
κ
xy) 7→ (m
σ
xy), Ψ :
((mσxx′), (txy)) 7→ (t
σ
xy), and finally ((m
σ
xx′), (t
σ
xx′)) 7→ (v
π
xy). Except for Ψ,
all of these mappings involve only the operations of addition, subtraction,
multiplication by a constant, maximum and minimum, which are certainly
continuous. Concerning the operator Ψ, let us recall that its output is the or-
thogonal projection of (txy) onto a certain convex set determined by (m
σ
xx′);
a general result of continuity for such an operation can be found in [5 ].
Corollary 6.2. The rank-like rates depend continuously on the relative fre-
quency of each possible content of an individual vote.
Proof. It suffices to notice that the Llull matrix (vxy) is simply the center of
gravity of the distribution specified by these relative frequencies (formula (1)
of § 1.3).
7 Decomposition
The decomposition property E is concerned with having a partition of A into
two non-empty sets X and Y such that each member of X is unanimously
preferred to any member of Y , that is:
vxy = 1 (and therefore vyx = 0) whenever xy ∈ X × Y . (75)
More specifically, property E, which was proved in [3 : § 9], ensures that in
the complete case such a situation is characterized by any of the following
equalities:
Rx = R˜x, for all x ∈ X, (76)
Ry = R˜y + |X|, for all y ∈ Y , (77)∑
x∈X
Rx = |X| (|X|+ 1)/2, (78)
where R˜x and R˜y denote the rank-like rates which are determined respec-
tively from the submatrices associated with X and Y .
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In this section we will see that some of these implications are still valid
under certain assumptions that allow for incompleteness. In particular, The-
orem 7.2 below entails that under the assumption of transitive individual
preferences an option gets a rank-like rate exactly equal to 1 if and only if it
is unanimously preferred to any other.
Lemma 7.1. Given a partition A = X ∪ Y into two disjoint nonempty
sets, one has the following implications:
vxy = 1
∀ xy ∈ X × Y
}
=⇒
{
mκxy=1
∀ xy ∈ X × Y
}
⇐⇒
{
vπxy = 1
∀ xy ∈ X × Y
(79)
If the individual preferences are transitive, then the converse of the first
implication holds too.
Proof. Here we will only prove the converse of the first implication in the
case of transitive individual preferences. All the other statements are proved
by the arguments given in [3 :Lemma 9.1].
Assume that mκxy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . Since m
κ
xy = v
∗
xy − v
∗
yx and
both terms of this difference belong to [0, 1], the only possibility is v∗xy = 1
(and v∗yx = 0). This implies the existence of a path x0x1 . . . xn from x to y
such that vxixi+1 = 1 for all i. But this means that all of the votes include
each of the pairs xixi+1 of this path. So, if they are transitive, all of them
include also the pair xy , i. e. vxy = 1.
Theorem 7.2. Condition (75) implies (78). If the individual preferences
are transitive, then the converse implication holds too.
Proof. On account of Lemmas 7.1 and 5.4, it suffices to see that (74) im-
plies (73). So, let us assume that vπxy = 1 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
By Lemma 5.1.(e), any admissible order ξ includes all pairs xy with x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y . Let ℓ be the last element of X in a fixed admissible order. Then
vπℓℓ′ = 1 and therefore t
π
ℓℓ′ = 1. On account of the pattern of growth of the
projected turnouts, that is inequalities (63), this implies that tπxx¯ = 1 for any
x, x¯ ∈ X .
Corollary 7.3. If the individual preferences are transitive, then Rx = 1
if and only if vxy = 1 for every y 6= x.
Theorem 7.4. If the individual votes are rankings (possibly truncated or
with ties), then (75) implies (76).
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Proof. As in (76) we will continue using a tilde to distinguish between hom-
ologous objects associated respectively with the whole matrix and with the
submatrix associated with X .
First of all we will show that
txy = 1, for all xy ∈ X ×A. (80)
In fact, the rules that we are using for translating votes into binary pref-
erences —namely, rules (a–d) of § 1.3— entail the following implications:
(i) vxy = 1 for some y ∈ A implies that x is explicitly mentioned in all of
the ranking votes; and (ii) x being explicitly mentioned in all of the ranking
votes implies that txy = 1 for any y ∈ A.
In particular, (80) ensures that the Llull matrix restricted to X is com-
plete, from which it follows that
t˜πxx¯ = 1, for all x, x¯ ∈ X .
Concerning the non-restricted matrix, we know, by Lemma 7.1, that con-
dition (75) implies vπxy = 1 and therefore t
π
xy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y . As in
the proof of Theorem 7.2, this implies that
tπxx¯ = 1, for all x, x¯ ∈ X .
On the other hand, Lemma 9.2 of [3 ], whose proof is valid in the general
case, ensures that m˜σxx¯ = m
σ
xx¯ for all x, x¯ ∈ X . Altogether, we get v˜
π
xx¯ = v
π
xx¯
for all x, x¯ ∈ X . Finally, (76) is a direct consequence of this equality together
with the above-remarked fact that vπxy = 1 for all xy ∈ X × Y .
8 Other properties
In this section we collect several other properties whose proof given in [3 ]
remains valid in the general case. The only caveat to bear in mind is that
here they ultimately rely on Theorem 4.3 of the present article instead of
[3 :Thm. 6.3]. One of these properties is here complemented by an additional
result that was not mentioned in [3 ].
The first of these properties is the Condorcet-Smith principle M:
Theorem 8.1 (Same proof as in [3 :Thm. 10.1]). Both the indirect majority
relation κ and the ranking determined by the rank-like rates comply with the
Condorcet-Smith principle: If A is partitioned into two sets X and Y with
the property that vxy > 1/2 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then one has also
xy ∈ κ and Rx < Ry for any such x and y .
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The next results are concerned with clone consistency. In this connection
we make use of the notion of autonomous sets. A subset C ⊆ A is said to be
autonomous for a relation ρ when each element from outside C relates to all
elements of C in the same way; in other words, when, for any x 6∈ C , having
ax ∈ ρ for some a ∈ C implies bx ∈ ρ for any b ∈ C , and similarly, having
xa ∈ ρ for some a ∈ C implies xb ∈ ρ for any b ∈ C . More generally, a
subset C ⊆ A will be said to be autonomous for a valued relation (vxy) when
the equalities vax = vbx and vxa = vxb hold whenever a, b ∈ C and x 6∈ C .
For more details about the notion of autonomous set and the property of
clone consistency we refer the reader to [3 : § 11].
Theorem 8.2 (Same proof as in [3 :Thm. 11.5 and 11.7]). Assume that C ⊂
A is autonomous for the Llull matrix (vxy). Then C is autonomous for the
indirect comparison relation κ as well as for the ranking determined by the
rank-like rates, i. e. for the relation ωˆ = {xy ∈ Π | Rx ≤ Ry}. Besides,
contracting C to a single option in the Llull matrix has no other effect in κ
and ωˆ than getting the same contraction.
Remark. In contrast to [3 :Thm. 11.6], in the incomplete case C is not en-
sured to be autonomous for the projected scores (vπxy). In fact, although
the intermediate projected margins (mσxy) do have this property, the inter-
mediate projected turnouts (tσxy) can do away with it. It would certainly
be interesting to find an alternative to step 4 (quadratic minimization with
constraints) so that the projected scores (vπxy) keep the autonomous sets of
the original Llull matrix (vxy) (in addition to the present properties).
Together with the facts stated in the preceding theorem, one could expect
that the restriction of the final ranking to C should coincide with the “local”
result that one obtains when starting from the restriction of the original Llull
matrix to C × C . A requirement of this sort (though concerning only the
winner) is included for instance in the property of “composition consistency”
considered in [8 ]. Our method does not entirely satisfy it. This is due to the
fact that C being autonomous does not prevent the indirect score v∗ab for
a, b ∈ C to come from outside C . However, the next result still ensures that
the differences between the local ranking and the global one are limited to
some strict preferences of the former being replaced by ties in the latter.
Theorem 8.3. Assume that C ⊂ A is autonomous for the Llull matrix (vxy).
Let R˜x denote the rank-like rates that are obtained on C when starting from
the restriction of (vxy) to xy ∈ C×C . The ranking that these rates determine
on C is related to that determined by the global rates Rx in the following way:
R˜a ≤ R˜b =⇒ Ra ≤ Rb, whenever a, b ∈ C . (81)
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Proof. We will systematically use a tilde to denote the objects that are
obtained when starting from the restriction of (vxy) to xy ∈ C ×C . Let a, b
be two arbitrary elements of C . The implication (81) will be a consequence
of the following one:
v˜∗ab ≥ v˜
∗
ba =⇒ v
∗
ab ≥ v
∗
ba, whenever a, b ∈ C . (82)
In fact, this is saying that ˆ˜κ ⊆ κˆ, which obviously entails (ˆ˜κ)∗ ⊆ (κˆ)∗ , and
therefore gives (81) by virtue of Theorem 5.2.
In order to prove (82) we begin by noticing that the definition of the
indirect scores ensures the inequality v∗ab ≥ v˜
∗
ab , as well as the analogous one
for ba instead of ab. This immediately settles (82) in the case v∗ba = v˜
∗
ba .
In the case v∗ba > v˜
∗
ba one can argue as follows. Having this strict inequality
means that the maximum that defines v∗ba is achieved by a path β from b to
a that contains some x ∈ A \C . Let β1 and β2 denote the segments of this
path that go respectively from b to x and from x to a. The desired result is
then obtained in the following way, where the second step makes use of the
fact that C is autonomous for the indirect scores [3 :Prop. 11.3]:
v∗ab ≥ min(v
∗
ax, v
∗
xb) = min(v
∗
bx, v
∗
xa) ≥ min(vβ1, vβ2) = vβ = v
∗
ba. (83)
Finally, we have the following (rather weak) property of monotonicity:
Theorem 8.4 (Same proof as in [3 :Thm. 12.1 and Cor. 12.2]). Assume that
(vxy) and (v˜xy) are related to each other in the following way:
v˜ay ≥ vay, v˜xa ≤ vxa, v˜xy = vxy, ∀x, y 6= a. (84)
In this case, the following properties are satisfied for any x, y 6= a:
v˜∗ay ≥ v
∗
ay, v˜
∗
xa ≤ v
∗
xa, (85)
Ra < Ry =⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y, (86)
(Ra < Ry, ∀y 6= a) =⇒ (R˜a < R˜y, ∀y 6= a). (87)
9 Approval voting
In approval voting, each voter is asked for a list of approved options, without
any expression of preference between them, and each option x is then rated
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by the number of approvals for it [2 : § 1 and 2]. In the following we will refer
to this number as the approval score of x, and its value relative to the
total number of votes V will be denoted by αx .
From the point of view of paired comparisons, an individual vote of ap-
proval type can be viewed as a truncated ranking where all the options that
appear in it are tied. In this section, we will see that the margin-based
variant orders the options exactly in the same way as the approval scores.
In other words, the method of approval voting agrees with ours in a qualita-
tive way under interpretation (d ′ ) of § 1.3, i. e. under the interpretation that
the non-approved options of each individual vote are tied. This interpreta-
tion is in congruence with the hypothesis of dichotomous preferences, under
which approval voting has especially good properties [16 ].
Having said that, the preliminary result 9.1 will hold not only under inter-
pretation (d ′ ) but also under interpretation (d), i. e. that there is no informa-
tion about the preference of the voter between two non-approved options, and
also under the analogous interpretation that there is no information about
his preference between two approved options. Interpretation (d ′ ) does not
play an essential role until Theorem 9.3, where we use the fact that it always
brings the problem into the complete case.
In the following we use the following notation:
µ(v) = {xy | vxy > vyx}, µˆ(v) = {xy | vxy ≥ vyx}, (88)
µ(α) = {xy | αx > αy}, µˆ(α) = {xy | αx ≥ αy}. (89)
Notice that µ(v∗) is the indirect comparison relation κ.
Proposition 9.1. In the approval voting situation, the following equality
holds:
vxy − vyx = αx − αy. (90)
As a consequence, µ(v) = µ(α).
Proof. Obviously, the possible ballots are in one-to-one correspondence with
the subsets X of A. In the following, vX denotes the relative number of votes
that approved exactly the set X . With this notation it is obvious that
αx =
∑
X∋ x
vX =
∑
X∋ x
X 6∋ y
vX +
∑
X∋ x
X∋ y
vX , (91)
for any y ∈ A. On the other hand, one has
vxy =
∑
X∋ x
X 6∋ y
vX +
[
1
2
∑
X∋ x
X∋ y
vX +
1
2
∑
X 6∋ x
X 6∋ y
vX
]
, (92)
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where each of the terms in brackets is present or not depending on which
interpretation is used. Anyway, the preceding expressions, together with the
analogous ones where x and y are interchanged with each other, result in
the equality (90) independently of those alternative interpretations.
Lemma 9.2. Assume that there exists a total order ξ such that the scores (vxy)
satisfy µ(v) ⊆ ξ together with the condition
vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ≻
ξ
y and z 6∈ {x, y}. (93)
Then one has also µ(v∗) ⊆ ξ , i. e. ξ is an admissible order. In the complete
case one has the equality µ(v∗) = µ(v).
Proof. Let us begin by recalling that µ(v) ⊆ ξ is equivalent to ξ ⊆ µˆ(v),
and similarly for µ(v∗) instead of µ(v). The first statement of the lemma
will be obtained by showing that under its hypotheses one has
v∗xy = vxy ≥ v
∗
yx ≥ vyx, whenever x ≻
ξ y . (94)
On account of the definition of v∗xy and the fact that vxy ≤ v
∗
xy (and analo-
gously for yx), in order to prove (94) it suffices to show that x ≻ξ y implies
vγ ≤ vxy, vη ≤ vxy, (95)
for any path γ = x0x1 . . . xn from x0 = x to xn = y , and for any path
η = y0y1 . . . yn from y0 = y to yn = x. Without loss of generality, in
the following we will assume n > 1 and we will let η be the reverse of γ ,
i. e. yi = xn−i . Let us assume that x ≻
ξ
y . In order to prove (95) we will
distinguish three cases, namely: (i) x ≻−
ξ xi ≻−
ξ y for all i; (ii) xi ≻
ξ x for
some i; (iii) y ≻ξ xi for some i.
Case (i) : It suffices to notice that the definition of the score of a path
and the assumptions of the lemma allow to write vγ ≤ vxx1 ≤ vxy and also
vη ≤ vx1x ≤ vxx1 ≤ vxy . For future reference, let us notice also that in the
complete case with vxy > 1/2 one can write vη ≤ vx1x ≤ 1/2 < vxy , so vη is
then strictly less than vxy .
Case (ii) : Let i be the first time that one has xi ≻
ξ x, and let j be
the first time after i that one has x ≻−
ξ xj . Obviously, 0 < i < j ≤ n.
By construction, we have x ≻−
ξ
xi−1 and xi ≻
ξ
x ≻ξ y , which entail that
vγ ≤ vxi−1xi ≤ vxxi ≤ vxy . On the other hand, we have xj−1 ≻
ξ x ≻ξ y and
x ≻−
ξ
xj , which entail vη ≤ vxjxj−1 ≤ vxxj−1 ≤ vxy . Similarly as above, in the
complete case with vxy > 1/2 we get the strict inequality vη < vxy .
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Case (iii) is analogous to case (ii).
The statement about the complete case will be proved if we show the
following implications
vxy > vyx =⇒ v
∗
xy > v
∗
yx, (96)
vxy = vyx =⇒ v
∗
xy = v
∗
yx. (97)
In order to obtain (96) it suffices to use the already remarked fact that in the
present circumstances the second inequality of (95) is strict, which implies
that one has also a strict inequality in the middle of (94). Finally, in order
to obtain (97) it suffices to use (94) with vxy = vyx = 1/2.
Theorem 9.3. In the approval voting situation, the margin-based variant
results in a full qualitative compatibility between the rank-like rates Rx and
the approval scores αx , in the sense that Rx < Ry ⇐⇒ αx > αy .
Proof. Recall that the margin-based variant amounts to using interpreta-
tion (d ′ ), which always brings the problem into the complete case (when the
terms in brackets are included, equation (92) has indeed the property that
vxy + vyx = 1).
Let ξ be any total ordering of the elements of A by non-increasing values
of αx . In other words, ξ is any total order contained in µˆ(α), which is
equivalent to say, any total order containing µ(α). We claim that we are
under the hypothesis of the preceding lemma. This is a consequence of
Proposition 9.1. In fact, on the one hand it immediately gives µ(v) ⊆ ξ .
On the other hand, it allows to deal with the margins mxy = vxy−vyx in the
following way:
mxz = αx − αz = (αx − αy) + (αy − αz) = mxy +myz ≥ myz ,
mzx = αz − αx = (αz − αy) + (αy − αx) = mzy +myx ≤ mzy,
where we have assumed x ≻ξ y and we have used that mxy = αx − αy ≥ 0
and myx = −mxy ≤ 0. The obtained inequalities are certainly equivalent to
those of (93).
By virtue of Lemma 9.2, we are therefore ensured that κ := µ(v∗) = µ(v).
Since we know that µ(v) = µ(α), we can also write κ = µ(α) and κˆ = µˆ(α),
which guarantees that κˆ is transitive. This allows to apply Corollary 5.3.(b)
to arrive at the conclusion that
Rx < Ry ⇐⇒ xy ∈ κ ⇐⇒ αx > αy.
36 R. Camps, X. Mora, L. Saumell
References
[1 ] Steven J. Brams, Michael W. Hansen, Michael E. Orrison, 2006. Dead heat:
the 2006 Public Choice Society election. Public Choice, 128 : 361–366.
[2 ] Steven J. Brams, 2008. Mathematics and Democracy · Designing Better
Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton Univ. Press.
[3 ] Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora, Laia Saumell, 2009. A continuous rating method
for preferential voting: the complete case. Social Choice and Welfare
(accepted for publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0548-z).
[4 ] Thomas H. Cormen, Charles L. Leiserson, Ronald L. Rivest, Clifford Stein,
19901 , 20012 . Introduction to Algorithms. MIT Press.
[5 ] Stella Dafermos, 1988. Sensitivity analysis in variational inequalities. Math-
ematics of Operations Research, 13 : 421–434.
[6 ] Jacqueline Feldman-Ho¨gaasen, 1969. Ordres partiels et permutoe`dre.
Mathe´matiques et Sciences Humaines, 28 : 27–38.
[7 ] David Kinderlehrer, Guido Stampacchia, 1980. An Introduction to Varia-
tional Inequalities and their Applications. Academic Press.
[8 ] Gilbert Laffond, Jean Laine´, Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier, 1996. Composition-
consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions. Social Choice
and Welfare, 13 : 75–93.
[9 ] Xavier Mora, 2008. CLC calculator. http://mat.uab.cat/~xmora/CLC-calcu
lator/.
[10 ] Jorge Nocedal, Stephen J. Wright, 19991 , 20062 . Numerical Optimization.
Springer.
[11 ] Jose´ Manuel Pita Andrade, A´ngel Aterido Ferna´ndez, Juan Manuel Mart´ın
Garc´ıa (eds.), 2000. Corpus Velazquen˜o. Documentos y textos (2 vol.).
Madrid, Ministerio de Educacio´n, Cultura y Deporte.
[12 ] Mathias Risse, 2001. Arrow’s theorem, indeterminacy, and multiplicity re-
considered. Ethics, 111 : 706–734.
[13 ] Markus Schulze, 1997–2003.
[a ] Posted in the Election Methods Mailing List. http://lists.electorama.com/
pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-October/001570.html
and 001545.html (see also ibidem /1998-January/001577.html).
[b ] Ibidem /1998-August/002045.html.
[c ] A new monotonic and clone-independent single-winner election method.
Voting Matters, 17 (2003) : 9–19.
[14 ] Markus Schulze, 2011. A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal sym-
metric, and Condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. Social
Choice and Welfare, 36 : 267–303.
Continuous rating for incomplete preferential voting 37
[15 ] T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2006. Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential
for Public Choice. Ashgate Publishing.
[16 ] Marc Vorsatz, 2007. Approval voting on dichotomous preferences. Social
Choice and Welfare, 28 : 127–141.
[17 ] Douglas R. Woodall, 1996.
[a ] Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules. Voting Matters, 6 :
9–14.
[b ] Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules. Discrete Applied
Mathematics, 77 (1997) : 81–98.
